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THE FORENSIC THEORY OF LAW.
I.
In every county of every state in the American Union there is
a group of hard-working, educated men who support themselves
and their families with money which they acquire by selling scien-
tific knowledge concerning one particular phenomenon. These men
are lawyers. The phenomenon concerning which they sell scientific
knowledge is law.
What is law? It is impossible to answer that question without
entering the domain of controversy. It is impossible to say any-
thing in the least degree positive or definite regarding the nature of
law without contradicting something equally positive and definite
already uttered by other persons. When we remember that the
phenomenon called law is something that has been characteristic of
all politically organized groups of human beings in all parts of the
world and at all periods of history, and when we remember further
how enormously these politically organized groups of human beings
have differed from one another, it is not surprising to find a certain
amount of conflict in the various notions of law that are accepted as
classic. It is safe to say that up to the present time no concept of
law has yet been made concrete in the consciousness of any human
being that is broad enough and at the same time distinct enough to
harmonize with all the forms of law that have existed among men.
Very frankly let it be admitted that there are certain restrictive
limitations making it impossible for any human being to think cos-
mically and with ideal clearness on the subject of law. For imme-
diate purposes it will be assumed that any person who undertakes to
discuss the nature of law must make allowance for three separate
factors, each of which is in the nature of a restrictive limitation upon
his powers of thought. These are, first, the restrictive limitation of
time; second, the restrictive limitation of nationality; third, the
restrictive limitation of vocation.
We human beings are in the habit of dividing time into the past,
the present, and the future. When we talk about the present we do
not mean a single instant in an abstract or mathematical sense. We
mean in a general way the recent past and the immanent future. It
is in that sense that the word is now used. It is quite proper to study
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the phenomenon of law in the past. It is quite proper to study the
phenomenon of law in the present. It is quite proper to study the
phenomenon of law in the future. But the mental processes and the
habits of thought of the student are apt to vary according as the sub-
ject of investigation is the law of the past, or the law of the present,
or the law of the future. Roughly speaking there are three methods,
or schools of jurisprudence which have to do with this three-fold
division of law. Historical jurisprudence has to do with the law of
the past. Analytical jurisprudence has to do with the law of the
present. Philosophical jurisprudence has to do with the law of the
future; that is to say, with the ideal possibilities of legal develop-
ment. The term philosophical jurisprudence has not been very pop-
ular with English-speaking lawyers since the days of the French
revolution. But in our own generation the thing is reappearing under
another name, to-wit, sociological jurisprudence. There is no doubt
a great difference between the particular forms of philosophical juris-
prudence of earlier centuries and the sociological jurisprudence of
the twentieth century, but looked at in a broad way sociological juris-
prudence must be regarded as simply a newer form of philosophical
jurisprudence. It has to do with possible improvements in positive
law.
Frankly recognizing the restrictive limitation of time, I now
announce that for immediate purposes the law to which attention is
invited is primarily a phenomenon of the present time, and not a
phenomenon of ancient history, anthropology, or primitive racial
psychology. As now regarded, law is primarily an existing phe-
nomenon and not primarily the subject matter of fanciful speculations
concerning the future. To express the same thought in technical
language the nature of law will be examined from the analytical
viewpoint rather than from the historical viewpoint or the philo-
sophical viewpoint. So much for the restrictive limitation of time.
What is meant by the restrictive limitation of nationality? One
of the most persistent and one of the most futile efforts of civiliza-
tion has been the effort to ignore nationality. The developed Roman
Empire went very far in ignoring nationality and the Roman Empire
ceased to exist. Christianity in theory transcends nationality, but the
theory is nothing but an attenuated tradition. Three years ago
Socialists in Europe shouted themselves hoarse for internationalism,
and today those same Socialists under national banners are pointing
machine guns at other Socialists under other banners who also
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shouted for internationalism three years ago. International law, inso-
far as it has ever attempted to do anything except emphasize the
rights of nations, is a beautiful bubble of emptiness. The biggest fact
in the world is the fact of nationality. Law is a function of nation-
ality. As nations differ so will laws differ, and so will the theories of
law differ. I offer no apology for stating most emphatically that I
am approaching law, not from a cosmopolitan standpoint, but from
an American standpoint. No investigator of law ever approached it
from any standpoint except a national standpoint, although some
investigators have sincerely thought otherwise. So much for the
restrictive limitation of nationality.
By the restrictive limitation of vocation is meant the narrowing
and also strengthening effect of a professional viewpoint. Lawyers
know more about law than do other people. If they did not they
would starve to death. The nature of the law is to be considered from
the viewpoint of those educated in the knowledge, the theories, the
experiences, the traditions, and the romances of the legal profession.
To sum up, the nature of law will be considered from the view-
point of a modem American lawyer.
II.
A definition of law will now be presented. This particular defini-
tion was first uttered in 1909 by the Supreme Court of the United
States while deciding a controversy betwen the American Banana
Company and the United Fruit Company. This is the Supreme
Court's definition: "Law is a statement of the circumstances in
which the public force will be brought to bear upon men through the
courts" (213 U. S. 347, 356). The notion of law corresponding to
these words is a notion distinctively modem, American and pro-
fessional. This definition comes nearer to satisfying the average
American lawyer who supports his family by selling systematized
knowledge of law than do any of the better known definitions which
have been inherited from earlier generations and imported from
across the Atlantic.
There are five elements in the notion of law made concrete by
these words. There is, first, a formulative element; second, a human
element; third, a political element; fourth, a coercive element; and,
fifth, a forensic element. The first four of these five elements will be
considered briefly. The fifth element, the forensic element, will be
considered at greater length.
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What is meant by the formulative element in law? Blackstone
described law as "a rule of conduct." Bentham designated it as a
"portion of discourse." Austin told us about a "command." This
definition refers to a "statement of circumstances." Note the formu-
lative suggestion in all of these words: rule, discourse, command,
statement. Law is something which is formulated or possesses the
possibility of being formulated. It is proper for us to talk about the
rules of baseball for 1926 although they have not yet been actually
formulated. We know perfectly well they will be formulated some
day or else they can never be rules. At the present time it is worth
while to emphasize this formulative element in law. The influence of
such men as William James, Maeterlinck, Bergson and Eucken has
been a broadening influence, but if allowed to operate indiscriminately
will appear also to be a confusing influence. Some people are dis-
posed to criticise our judges because they are not impressionistic
enough, because they are not sufficiently spiritual, because they do not
decide cases according to inherent justice-whatever that may be-
or because they do not act in accordance with the promptings of their
own consciences. This is an attack upon the formulative element of
law. If our courts could decide cases without being able to give rea-
sons and without formulating a rule of decision, they might be admin-
istering something better than law, but they certainly would not be
administering law. We lawyers are perfectly willing to debate with
anarchists the question: Should law be abolished? We are unwilling
to debate with sentimentalists the question: Should law exist without
a formulative element? That would be like considering the desirability
of drawing square circles or manufacturing white lampblack,
In this generation it is unnecessary to emphasize the human
element in law when the term is being used in its professional sense.
The hypothesis of a divine law operating upon angels is accepted by
many lawyers, but the acceptance or rejection of that hypothesis does
not have the slightest effect upon the ability or usefulness of any
lawyer in the land. Rudyard Kipling can tell us many interesting
things regarding the law of the jungle, but the law of the jungle is
not real law for the simple reason that it does not possess the human
element. The Supreme Court's definition of law is limited to circum-
stances which operate upon men and what is owned by men.
What is meant by the political element in law? No one knows
exactly. During the past few centuries the political element of law
has nearly always been identified with the power of the state. All
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will agree that there must be a political element in the notion of law.
It is also true, however, that many earnest men on the advance guard
of thought are contemplating the possibility of law sanctioned by a
political power radically different from the state, as that term is
commonly understood. "The public right" was a favorite and signifi-
cant expression of Mr. Gladstone's. The public right is a political
right and a national right, but not necessarily the same thing as the
right of the state or the right of the Government. Mr. Woodrow
Wilson used to teach his students at Princeton to glory in the fact
that the Constitution of the United States is a revolutionary document.
Its adoption was due to a deliberate and splendid violation of the
right of the state as expressed in the Articles of Confederation. The
Supreme Court's definition makes use of the word "public," but does
not make use of the word "state." The Supreme Court's definition
is so broad that it would not pass muster in orthodox circles in the
German universities. The sanction of law must be a public sanction,
which means a national sanction, but not necessarily a state sanction.
Austin in England and Stammler in Germany deserve credit for
making clear that a coercive element is essential to the existence of
law. Without the coervice element and the machinery for applying
force, it would be difficult to distinguish between law and conven-
tionality-for instance, the conventionality that a man must not wear
a red necktie when in full evning dress. At the same time the prac-
tical importance of the coercive element must not be overestimated.
Physical force in American jurisprudence is like real money in the
American business world. A very little, with confidence- in our fellow
men-that is credit-goes a long way.
The distinctive feature of this twentieth-century American
definiiton of law is the express inclusion of the forensic element.
That law exists only by virtue of a sanction from the state or ultimate
political authority has long been a truism. This twentieth-century
definition of the Supreme Court deliberately, scientifically, and with-
out apologetic empiricism, includes as an essential ingredient the idea
that courts are the law-functioning organs of the nation. The idea
itself has been floating around for a long time. In 1803 Chief Justice
Marshall, in the famous case of Marbury vs. Madison, said: "It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is."
In 1820, Daniel Webster, while speaking before a Constiutional
Convention in Massachusetts, said: "The Constitution being the
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supreme law, it follows, of course, that every act of the legislature
contrary to the law must be void. But who shall decide the question?
Shall the legislature itself decide? If so, then the Constituion ceases
to be a legal and becomes only a moral restraint on the legislature.
If they, and they only, are to decide whether their acts be conform-
able to the Constitution, then the Constitution is admonitory or advi-
sory only, not legally binding; because, if the construction of it rest
wholly with them, their discretion in particular cases, may be in favor
of very erroneous and dangerous constructions. Hence the courts of
law, necessarily when the case arises, must decide upon the validity
of particular acts."
The idea of the forensic nature of law must have been in the
mind of Abraham Lincoln when, making a public speech in 1858, he
said: "What are the uses of decisions of courts? They have two
uses. As rules of property they have two uses. First-they decide
upon the question before the court. They decide in this case that
Dred Scott was a slave. Nobody resists that. Not only that, but they
say to everybody else that persons standing just as Dred Scott stands
are as he is. That is, they say that when a question comes up upon
another person, it will be so decided again, unless the court decides
in another way, unless the court overrules its decision. Well, we
mean to do what we can to have the court decide the other way."
During the twentieth century the forensic notion has become
much more distinct. In 1908, the late Professor John Chipman Gray
of the Boston Bar and the Harvard Law School said to the students
of the Columbia Law School: "The law of the state or of any
organized body of men is composed of the rules which the courts,
that is, the judicial organs of that body, lay down for the determina-
tion of legal rights and duties." In 1913, my friend, Mr. Frederick
N. Judson, of the St. Louis Bar, while lecturing before the students
of the Law School of Yale University, said: "The English and
American conception of law is a body of rules enforced by the
courts."
No court, no law. That is the American formula. As the
phenomenon of law is understood by American lawyers, it cannot
posibly exist without the coincidence of another phenomenon,
namely, a judicial forum.
III.
The most important reason for the existence of the American
theory as to the nature of law is connected with the distinctively
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American doctrine of the judicial review of legislation. We Amer-
icans have gone further than any other people, ancient or modem, in
extending the domain of judicial inquiry. As with other nations, so
with us, customary law is now in the domain of judicial inquiry. As
with other nations, so with us, statutory law is within the domain of
judicial inquiry. Going still further our nation has placed constitu-
tional law also within the domain of judicial inquiry. In the courts
of both Europe and America, when the customary law is found to
conflict with stautory law, the courts declare the former to be abro-
gated. In the courts of America, but not in the courts of Europe,
when statutory law is deemed to be in conflict with constitutional law
the former is declared to be abrogated.
In 1885 Sir Henry Maine referred to this function of our courts
as "a virtually unique creation of the founders of the Constitution,"
and added: "The success of this experiment has blinded men to its
novelty. There is no precedent for it in the ancient or in the modem
world." In art, in music, and even in literature we Americans are
colonial, imitative, echoing. In art, music and literature our greatest
works, as judged by our most competent critics, are the works which
produce not the joy of surprise, but the joy of recognition-the
pleasure of recalling something still greater done by masters on the
other side of the Atlantic. In Constitutional jurisprudence we are
not colonial, but truly national, original, creative. And we are so
regarded in other parts of the world.
The doctrine of judicial review is inseparably connected with the
case of Marbury vs. Madison. In Willoughby's greatest of all text-
books on American constitutional law, published in 1910, the first
case cited is Marbury vs. Madison. In foreign countries Marbury
vs. Madison is looked upon as an expression of American culture in
very much the same way as the Divine Comedy is looked upon by us
as an expression of Italian culture. One hundred and thirteen years
ago this famous law suit finally established as law the proposition that
the Federal courts have the power to declare void those acts of Con-
gress which in the opinion of the courts are contrary to the Consti-
tution. A similar proposition is also established with reference to
the state courts. This is the doctrine of judicial review. The doc-
trine is law because it is acted upon by the courts. As to the source
of this law there are three chief views. According to the first or
orthodox view-the view of Marshall, Kent, Webster and Cooley-.
the doctrine follows as a "demonstration" from a mere textual criti-
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cism of the Constitution. According to the second view-advanced
by Jefferson and Jackson, and still held by some eminent men, includ-
ing Chief Justice Walter Clark of North Carolina-a textual criti-
cism of the Constitution shows that the doctrine should not exist,
and is, therefore, based upon "usurpation." The third view is the
one generally held by the younger members of the American Bar.
According to this view a mere textual criticism of the Constitution
leaves in doubt the question whether or not the framers of the Con-
stitution intended to establish judicial review of legislation. Conse-
quently higher criticism (i. e., historical criticism) is resorted to.
Attention is paid to the views of historians and political scientists.
The ideas, theories, hopes, fears, speeches, writings of the men who
wanted the Constitution, who drafted it, who adopted it, who fought
it, who obeyed it, who disobeyed it, who loved it, who hated it-all
these have been studied carefully and the conclusion has come as a
matter of fact that the American people, both Federalists and Anti-
federalists, in the days when snuff-boxes and shoe-buckles were pop-
ular, looked upon the Constitution as a document which authorized
judicial review. The net result is a confirmation by history of the
theory of the orthodox school.
But it really does not make a particle of difference what his-
torical view one takes. The history of law is something very interest-
ing, but it is not the same thing as law. The doctrine of judicial
review is law because it is acted upon by the courts.
In addition to this chief reason, connected with the American
doctrine of judicial review, there are several other reasons why
Americans have come to manifest this distinctively national trait in
their attitude toward law. The first of these other reasons has to
do with the romantic and almost mystical doctrine of the "three
powers"--the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. It is a mis-
take to assume, as certain modern critics have done, that when Mon-
tesquieu advanced this doctrine in his "Spirit of the Laws," published
in 1748, he was advancing something idly evolved from his own
speculation. On the contrary, Montesquieu, largely influenced by
John Locke, was trying to explain the existing institutions of govern-
ment in his day, particularly in England, where he lived for eighteen
months in his middle age. By what seems like a sort of divination,
Montesquieu hit upon distinctions in political science which although
theoretical in his day, have since come to be vindicated and actually
expressed in the practical experience of mankind.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol2/iss1/2
THE FORENSIC THEORY OF LAW.
It is easy to criticize Montesquieu's doctrine. It is easy to
accuse him of dogmatism. It is easy to point out danger in a too nar-
row application of his analysis. The fact remains that Montesquieu's
formula, accepted with almost religious devotion by the American
colonists, has had a direct influence in producing an American notion
of law, which exalts the judiciary to a higher degree than is true of
any other notion of law that the world has yet seen. Said the late
Mr. Justice Harlan of the United States Supreme Court in 1906: "The
great doctrine of the separate independent exercise of judicial author-
ity, as distinguished from legislative and executive authority, is essen-
tially American in origin, for while the thought was suggested by a
European publicist shortly prior to the Revolution, it was not distinctly
formulated or embodied in a governmental document until that was
done in this country in 1776."
Still another reason for the growth of the forensic theory of law
in America is due to the enthusiastic reception by Americans of the
English notion that the executive or administrative officials of the
government are subject to the ordinary law of the land. The effective
distinction between administrative law and civil law, so common on
the continent of Europe, is unknown to Anglo-American jurispru-
dence. Before the American Revolution, especially in connection with
the Wilkes trials involving the freedom of the press, Magna Charta
was interpreted by the courts of England as a document confirming
rights to be asserted by the humblest citizens as against the most
powerful officers of government-not in special tribunals under con-
trol of those officials, but in the ordinary courts of the realm. If
a newsboy is arrested illegally by a policeman in St. Louis, the news-
boy can make a complaint to the Police Board if he chooses, but he
can also bring a suit for damages in the Circuit Court. E'very action
of every administrative official in England and the United States
affecting liberty or property is subject to the acid test of legality in
the ordinary courts where a grocer's claim for the price of sugar
and cheese would be tested. It is the same system of law and the
same kind of a tribunal that tests the legality of the grocer's account
and the action of the Secretary of State.
One more reason for exalting the judiciary of the United States
may be mentioned. It is connected with the extraordinary duty cast
upon the state judges of this country during the first seventy-five years
of our national independence. To this duty those judges responded
in a way that has not yet been sufficiently praised. This extraordinary
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duty was not performed by a mere half-dozen great men like Kent,
Shaw and Gibson. It was performed and most adequately performed
by a multitude of sincere and patriotic lawyers who went upon the
bench infused with that greatest of all blessings, practical common
sense. These men, at the very time when it was fashionable in England
to speak with scorn of the common law, took the common law and
equity of the mother country, that is to say, the traditional as dis-
tinguished from the statutory law of England, and worked the same
over into a living, practical and serviceable body of rules of decision
whereby human controversy in America could be settled and human
strife avoided. The social and economic conditions in America at
the beginning of the nineteenth century were very different from the
social and economic conditions in England at the same time. A too
rigid application of the English common law, a colonial attitude of
mind on the part of the judges, an ignoring of the maxim to the effect
tfat law varies as the reason for law varies-such circumstances
might have changed the entire current of American history and cer-
tainly would have prevented American law today from being what
it really is. It has always been the popular fashion to give a vast
amount of credit to those persons who were responsible for the actual
drafting of our written constitutions and our statutes. It has not
been the popular fashion to give credit to, or even think very much
about, the hundreds of patient, studious and sensible state judges who
accomplished one of the most remarkable tasks that has ever been
accomplished by any jurists in the history of the world, and that was
to take the traditional law of one nation and make it over into the
traditional law of another nation. It is because American lawyers
have appreciated this extraordinary obligation to the American state
judges prior to 1850, that American lawyers are finding it impossible
for themselves to think about American law without at the same
time thinking about the American tribunals in which that law has
always been demonstrated.
IV.
Let us now take up the consideration of some practical applica-
tions of the forensic theory of law.
If law is simply a combination of circumstances under which
public force is applied through the courts, what is a statute? Of
course, all statutes conveniently may be referred to as if they were
laws, just as all diminutive human bodies may be referred to as if
they were babies. But some diminutive human bodies are not really
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babies at all. They are corpses. In exactly the same way, some
statutes are not really laws. They are scraps of paper. It is a very
solemn duty that courts perform when they declare a statute uncon-
stitutional. The courts do it only with much reluctance. Neverthe-
less, under the American theory of constitutionalism as now most
firmly established, it is the duty of our American courts to compare
statutes with the Constitution when called upon to do so in a law
suit, and boldly to declare any statute null and void if it conflicts
with the Constitution. Accepting the Supreme Court's definition of
law, it would follow that a statute is simply one of several circum-
stances to be considered in determining the existence or non-exist-
ence of law.
Can there be such a thing as law in the absence of an express
adjudication by the courts? It is impossible for an American lawyer
today to imagine an American community livink with an entire
absence of judicial precedents. Even in new states and territories,
the legislative authorities find it necessary to adopt the early common
law of England which for practical purposes is nothing more or less
than an aggregation of judicial precedents. It is just as easy to think
of a black bass swimming without water as it is to think of American
civilization existing without judicial precedents. When we come to
any particular point of doubt concerning which there has not yet
been an express adjudication, can it be said that there is any law on
that point? Some lawyers, following the late Professor John Chip-
man Gray, boldly answer "No." Most lawyers will answer "Yes."
The law has not been formulated, but it possesses the possibility of
being formulated. It is fated to be formulated. By far the most
difficult professional work that a lawyer does is to give his opinion
on doubtful questions of law. The test of a lawyer's sagacity is a
comparison between his anticipatory opinion and the subsequent deci-
sion in the court of last resort. From a social standpoint perhaps
the most important work that a lawyer does, and also the easiest, is
to give advice on questions concerning which there is no doubt among
lawyers as to how the courts would decide if called upon to do so.
But from a professional standpoint more significant work is the giving
of opinions on doubtful questions.
Attention must now be called to a notable distinction between
Anglo-American jurisprudence, on the one hand, and continental juris-
prudence on the other hand. On the continent of Europe, there are
two kinds of tribunals-one kind of tribunal for applying law as
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW.
between private citizen and private citizen, and another kind of tribu-
nal for applying law as between private citizen and public official. The
administrative tribunals in which the causes of executive officials are
ultimately judged, are in control of the executive officials themselves,
and not subject to review by the ordinary courts. The most eminent
French and German jurists praise their system, and prefer it to ours.
It is not for us to say that our system would be better for them than
theirs. It is not necessary for us, even, to say with too much dog-
matism that our system is better for us than theirs. But this we must
say: Unless we are prepared to give up that entity which in the Con-
stitution is called the "law of the land," we must hold fast to our
system. The law of the land means a law that is certain and uniform,
and is made certain and uniform as a result of one kind of ultimate
tribunals, and not two kinds of ultimate tribunals. We have enough
complexity now, thanks to the concurrent jurisdiction of state and
federal courts, without introducing the still more confusing factor
of administrative law superimposed upon civil law-as they call it in
Europe, or the law of the land, as we call it in this country.
This is the place where every American lawyer wants to wave
the red flag of danger. There is a marked tendency in contemporary
statesmanship to take steps-proper enough in themselves-which
may lead to constitutional changes more serious than the establish-
ment of a monarchy or a national church. It is proper to have martial
law and military tribunals. It is proper to have a patent office, a land
office, a postmaster with power to issue fraud orders, an interstate
commerce commission, an immigration bureau, a pure food commis-
sion. It is proper and necessary to have a law-interpreting officer in
every executive department of the federal government, and for him,
in doulitful cases under new statutes, to hear both sides, before ren-
dering a decision, which is in the nature of a legal instruction to
executive officers. It is proper to have public-utility commissions in
our various states, and boards of health, and insurance commissions,
and examining boards for tonsorial artists, perhaps. We lawyers are
in hearty sympathy with most, if not all, of these sincere efforts to
recognize the changing conditions of our civilization. But we are
sensitive to a great danger. We do not want to substitute the multi-
tudinous and confusion laws of a hundred bureaus for the law of the
land. These bureaus are executive, primarily. Incidentally and occa-
sionally, they have judicial functions to perform, just as a lawyer has
a judicial function to perform when he undertakes to settle a dispute
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between a grocer and his landlord. But whenever these bureaus act
judicially, their rulings if questioned must be subject to prompt review
in the ordinary courts, unless we are ready to change in momentous
degree the nature and genius of American civilization. For the most
part, there is no doubt about the purely tentative aspect of executive
determinations on doubtful points of law. In the Federal Trade Com-
mission statute, a direct method of judicial review is provided by the
statute itself, on points of law. In some other cases, the Supreme
Court has read the right of judicial review into statutes, by reason
of the mere existence of judicial powers. In a few instances, as with
the land office, Congress and even the Supreme Court have exhibited
a most regrettable indifference to the subtle and anti-American danger
of an executive intrusion upon the judicial domain. Scandals in the
patent office, always subject to judicial review, have been infinitesimal,
compared with scandals in the land office, so largely independent of
judicial review. President Taft, with the true lawyer's insight, but
in vain, urged Congress to pass statutes providing for appeal to the
courts from the rulings in the land office.
On another occasion, President Taft himself made the most dra-
matic, if not the most important, of recent executive determinations
of judicial questions, when he decided the famous controversy over
"What is whiskey?" The episode is a fine illustration of the true
nature of executive determinations on points of law. The President,
admitted by his bitterest enemies in politics to be one of the best
lawyers of his generation, was construing the misbranding section of
the pure food statute. There was no authoritative interpretation by
the appellate courts. The President gave instructions to his subor-
dinates in the executive department of the government, after hear-
ing men on both sides, who had financial interests at stake, and their
attorneys. The President's mind acted exactly as if he were a judge.
But he was not a judge. Nobody was bound by his decision, except
tentatively. To this day, the Taft ruling can be ignored by any citi-
zen who wishes to test the matter in the courts. The fact that nobody
has seen fit to bring the matter into court is a tribute to the legal ability
of William H. Taft. But it does not mean that the President of the
United States is a judge, or ever will be.
One more test of the forensic theory must be made.
If law is simply that which the courts say is law, does it not
follow, ultimately, that law is the whimsicality of a judge or a group
of judges? This question suggests the chief and most important criti-
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cism of the forensic theory of law. In one form or another, this
criticism has been urged by many men, and by no man more sincerely
or more vigorously than by Thomas Jefferson. The criticism does not
seem to have prevented the development of our American doctrine of
judicial supremacy, but probably it has retarded conscious acquiescence
in the doctrine, and frank admission of its existence. It cannot be
stated too emphatically that law is a matter of human experience. The
value of this criticism, or any other criticism, regarding law, should
be tested in the light of human experience.
Do judges act whimsically? Are they capricious? Is that their
reputation as a class in this country, or in any country, at this period,
or any period? American judges today are being criticised freely by
men who are eminent, sincere and highly educated. Are American
judges criticised because they are too whimsical? No. They are
not whimsical enough-that is the criticism. At the meeting of the
American Bar Association, in October, 1914, the President of the
United States, with dignified courtesy to be sure, criticised American
judges of the present day. But he did not criticise them for being
too independent. On the contrary, his criticism was that judges are
slavish, all too slavish, in their devotion to the precedents of the
past. When one analyzes any of the current criticisms of the Ameri-
can judiciary, one will find that the real ground of criticism is not
that the judges are too subjective, but that they are not subjective
enough. Most emphatically judges do respect the external objective
siandards, whether they be the precedents of the past, or the written
Constitution, or the dogmas of a political party, or some economic
theory. The question raised by the critics is this: Do not the judges
respect these external standards too highly? The most important
things in the world are habits of thought. Here is where psychology
is needed in connection with jurisprudence.
In the American sense, law, whether it has to do with the wages
of a nursemaid or the constitutionality of a statute, is simply the
opinion which is, or is fated to be a rule of decision in the court of
last resort. Of course, it is assumed that the court of last resort
will be a bench of American judges, and not a group of oriental
potentates. The difference between a constiutional judge in America
and an oriental potentate is a difference in habits of thought. Habits
of thought are the most important things in the world. The federal
constitution, federal statutes, federal treaties, the state constitution,
state statutes, the common law of England, American precedents of
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the past, customs and the current needs of society-all these things
are sources of law. They are among the circumstances which deter-
mine the existence and meaning of law. But we would have nothing
except chaos if it were not for the courts, with their distinctive habits
of thought to co-relate these multitudinous circumstances. The
lawyer's aim is to acquire the same habits of thought that the judges
of his generation acquire, and thus to avoid the necessity of law-suits,
or else to win law-suits when forced upon him.
In this unexplored region-the borderland between jurisprudence
and psychology-the most interesting problem has to do with the
overruling of precedents. The prevailing attitude of American courts,
which is more liberal than the attitude of the English courts, was
never more carefully stated than by the Supreme Court of Massa-
chusetts in 1900 (Stack v. Railroad Co., 177 Mass. 155). A rail-
road company was sued by a person for damages suffered through
an accident on the road. The defendant asked the court to order
a physical examination by a surgeon. No statute covered the situa-
tion. The court said:
"We agree that in view of the great increase of actions for per-
sonal injuries it may be desirable that the courts should have the power
in dispute. We appreciate the ease with which, if we were careless
or ignorant of precedent, we might deem it enlightened to assume
that power. We do not forget the continuous process of developing
the law that goes on through the courts in the form of deduction or
deny that in a clear case it might be possible even to break away from
a line of decisions in favor of some rule generally admitted to be
based upon a deeper insight into the present wants of society. But
the improvements made by the courts are made, almost invariably, by
very slow degrees and by very short steps. Their general duty is not
to change, but to work out, the principles already sanctioned by the
practice of the past. No one supposes that a judge is at liberty to
decide with sole reference even to his strongest convictions of policy
and right. His duty in general is to develop the principles which he
finds with such consistency as he may be able to attain. . . . In the
present case we perceive no such pressing need of our anticipating
the legislature as to justify our departure from what we cannot doubt
is the settled tradition of the common law to a point beyond that
which we believe to have been reached by equity, and beyond any
to which our statutes dealing with kindred subjects have ever seen fit
to go. It will be seen that we put our decisions, not upon the impolicy
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of admitting such a power, but on the ground that it would be too
great a step of judicial legislation to be justified by the necessities of
the case."
V.
This essay is intended, primarily, to be an analytical considera-
tion of the nature of law as an existing phenomenon, without regard
to any philosophical or sociological speculation concerning the pur-
pose of law or the possibility of improving law through the conscious
effort of humanity. However, it would be an affectation for any lawyer
to assume indifference to the possibility of improving law through the
conscious effort of humanity. In order to avoid any appearance of
that affectation, even at the risk of inconsistency, I will add one com-
ment of a speculative and sociological nature-perhaps I should say
a political nature.
This comment has to do with the American doctrine of judicial
review of legislation. The United States has developed, as the most
distinctive feature of its civilization, the judicial function of passing
upon the constitutionality of statutes. It is a notable power that our
courts possess, and, in the opinion of most American lawyers, it is a
beneficial power. Distrust of the legislature is characteristic of Amer-
icans, as is natural, since our American Revolution was really a
rebellion against parliament, rather than against the king, or the courts
of England. I know many lawyers, but I have never met one who
wished to take this power away from the American courts. At the
same time, I have never talked on this subject with any American
lawyer who did not frankly admit, in private conversation, that this
power has been grossly abused by some of our judges. Judges are
human beings. We human beings are slaves to habits of thought,
which means that we are slaves to something which is commonly
called prejudice. It is easy for a judge to persuade himself that his
habits of thought along partisan, religiuus or economic lines are a
part of the constitution which he is oath-bound to support.
There is a radical and lasting difference between an ordinary
law-suit affecting the rights of persons and property, and a law-suit
in which the constitutionality of statutes-that is to say, the conscious
public policy of the state-is involved. My friend, Mr. P. Taylor
Bryan, of the St. Louis Bar, has proposed that jurisdiction be con-
ferred upon the Missouri courts to entertain the petition of any citizen
who requests that the constitutionality of a particular statute be passed
upon-the Attorney-General to be the defendant. This admirable
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suggestion is mentioned now, simply for the purpose of showing how
clear in the mind of a sagacious practicing lawyer is the distinction
between an ordinary law-suit and a law-suit which involves the con-
stitutionality of a statute. In the latter case, the real defendant, when
we look beneath the surface, is the state-sometimes acting vicariously
for human beings as yet unborn.
Nearly all the current criticism of the courts is caused by the
occasional judicial abuse of this most valuable judicial power. In the
early days of our country, the courts were very particular to point
out the distinction between ordinary law-suits and law-suits involving
the constitutionality of statutes. Chief Justice Marshall undertook
to establish the precedent that the United States Supreme Court would
not pass on the constitutionality of a statute unless all the judges were
present, although this full-bench requirement was never dreamed of
for ordinary cases. By 1860, there was a considerable body of rules,
which seemed to be in the nature ol traditional limitations on the
power of the courts to declare void the acts of the legislature. These
traditional limitations are still printed in the law books. It is said
that there must be a full bench, that there must be no doubt in the
case, that there must never be an adverse decision by a lower court,
etc. What do these traditional limitations amount to now, in 1916?
Nothing at all. In St. Louis a justice of the peace on Easton avenue
has the power, and has exercised the power, of declaring void the
statutes of Missouri. This violates a rule laid down in Willoughby's
great work of 1910. But this rule and the others were based upon
dicta and tradition. They were never law, in the American sense,
because they were never recognized as binding by the courts. Our
courts have not formed the habit of recognizing as binding mere dicta
and expressions of good taste. They have formed the habit of recog-
nizing as binding the mandatory language of our written constitu-
tions. The so-called rules referred to are noteworthy because they
indicate an intent, a hope, a desire, an aspiration of such men as
Tyler of Virginia, Tilghman of Pennsylvania, Charlton of Georgia,
Waties of South Carolina, Daggett of Connecticut, and Cooley of
Michigan.
The effort of these men to establish unwritten legal limitations
on the power of judicial review has failed utterly. In the courts of
the United States and of all states in the union except two, there is
no mandatory distinction between constitutional cases and ordinary
cases. Has not the time come to recognize this distinction by means
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of constitutional amendments? Has not the time come to establish
a mandatory limitation on the power of judiciary review?That, in my judgment, is the most serious coristitutional ques-
tion now before the American people. The agitation for a change is
here. Some change is inevitable. The danger is that the change
will be too radical. If by the recall of judicial decisions is meant
the power of annulling by popular vote a unanimous decision in the
supreme court of a state on a constitutional question, then I am most
earnestly opposed to it, because such a power would lead to judicial
confusion. But if by the recall of judicial decisions, is meant simply
the power of selecting by popular vote between a majority opinion
and a minority opinion in the supreme court on a constitutional ques-
tion, then the plan is worthy of serious and (I am sorry to have to
add this additional word) courteous consideration. The so-called
Ohio plan, originally proposed by Chief Justice Clark of North Caro-
lina, and now a part of the fundamental law of Ohio, inhibits any
judicial annulment of legislation if more than one of the seven mem-
bers of the supreme court dissent from the majority opinion. This
plan also deserves serious consideration.
Both of these plans emphasize the inherent distinction between
an ordinary law-suit and a constitutional law-suit. These plans are
not nearly so radical as many people, after superficial examination,
have supposed. They are simply efforts to hem in and limit the
extraordinary power of judicial review. Marshall, Patterson, Samuel
Chase and Bushrod Washington-to mention four early members of
the United States Supreme Court-attempted to hem in this extraor-
dinary power by starting a traditional and customary limitation. Their
effort failed. The time has now come to do the same thing by the
mandatory language of constitutional amendments.
TymrLa, WILIAMS.
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